

**Do migrants adopt new political attitudes from abroad?**  
**Evidence using a multi-sited exit-poll survey during the 2013 Malian elections**

Lisa Chauvet<sup>a,b,c</sup>, Flore Gubert<sup>a,d</sup> and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps<sup>a</sup>

***Abstract***

In this article, we examine whether migration experience provides an opportunity for Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether this translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. We use a multi-sited exit-poll survey which was conducted during the Malian 2013 presidential election in Mali, France, and Côte d'Ivoire to investigate whether Malian migrants have different perceptions and political behavior than their non-migrant counterparts. By distinguishing between Malian migrants living in France and Côte d'Ivoire, we provide evidence that not only migrants have different perceptions of Malian democratic institutions than their non-migrant counterparts, but also that the institutional context of the host country matters for the adoption of political norms.

a Institut de Recherche pour le développement, LeDA-DIAL, Université Paris-Dauphine

b Banque de France

c FERDI

d Paris School of Economics

## 1. Introduction

With remittances being now recognized as one of the main sources of external funding for developing countries, most of the analyses investigating the relationship between migration and development have focused on the financial returns of migration for origin countries. However, the last 15 years have witnessed an increasing interest in “social remittances”, that is the ideas, know-how, practices, and skills that are transferred by migrants from host to sending communities (Levitt, 1998, 2001). Closely tied to the paradigm of transnationalism, social remittances are considered by some authors as potentially having greater impacts on origin countries (see, *e.g.* Kapur and McHale, 2005 and Kapur, 2010). Yet, the existing empirical evidence to support this assertion is still limited, as the effects of the circulation of ideas, norms, and practices are hard to capture. One promising line of research in this field investigates the political changes induced by migration. Contact with more democratic countries may indeed change migrants’ political beliefs and practices, and migrants may in turn transfer these newly-acquired political opinions to people in their origin countries when they return home or via cross-border connections. By so doing, migrants have the potential to be agents of change and help strengthen democracy in their home country.

In this paper, we investigate whether migration experience provides an opportunity for Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether this translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. Our assumption is that thanks to migration, individuals are confronted to a new environment and are naturally led to ask themselves how their home country compares to this new environment on various dimensions such as civil liberties, the functioning of institutions, etc. Depending on the institutional quality of the country they reside in, this comparison may be favorable or unfavorable to the home country and is likely to influence the perceptions migrants have on domestic political institutions. As a result, their perceptions should be different from the ones of non-migrants.

Our focus on Malian migrants is justified on two grounds: Mali’s migration patterns on the one hand and Mali’s experience with democracy on the other hand. With regards to the first point, Mali has a long-lasting history of migration both within the African continent and to Europe. According to household survey data collected in 2011, about 328,400 Malians reside abroad and 1.2 million Malian residents have undertaken at least one migration abroad over their lifetime out of a population of 15.9 million<sup>1</sup>. As a result, 21% of the Malian population

---

<sup>1</sup> Migration is defined as having lived outside Mali more than six months.

aged 15 or more live in a household with at least one member abroad and 48.4% in a household with at least one return migrant from abroad (Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps, 2013 ; Sougane, 2015). Most international migrants reside in neighboring Western African countries, with Côte d'Ivoire being by far the main destination country.<sup>2</sup> The colonial history of Mali, as well as its geographical situation has also resulted in significant migration flows from Mali to France since the end of the 1950s, and around 16% of Malian migrants currently reside in France (Chauvet *et al*, op.cit.). The size of the Malian diaspora, along with the close links that it keeps with its origin country, has made of migration an important phenomenon for the Malian society.

Turning to political issues, the situation of Mali has drastically evolved over the past years. Having had elected representatives at the national and local levels for 20 years, Mali was considered an example of smooth and successful transition to democracy.<sup>3</sup> This vision lasted until March 22, 2012 when a *coup d'état* followed by an armed conflict with ethnic separatists and religious extremists in the Northern part of the territory endangered Mali's political system.<sup>4</sup> Since then, the country has been considered as a fragile democracy. In terms of electoral participation, voter turnout has increased over the past 15 years from slightly less than 30% in the 1997 presidential election to around 50% in 2013. Participation rates remain low, though, which contrasts with the impressive number of political parties. In 2009, no less than one hundred parties participated to the local election. However, this high fragmentation hides the domination of *the Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali* (ADEMA) over the Malian political life for more than a decade. With regards external voting, Mali has granted voting rights to its citizens living abroad since 1991. Considerably lower than the internal voter turnout, the external voter turnout was 19.3% in 2007, but increased up to 44.6% in 2013 (Dedieu, 2013). This rise, which could have been even higher if the registration process had been simplified, illustrates the potentially important role played by Malian migrants in the political life of their origin country.

In order to assess whether migration experience translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institution, we draw on original data from the project "Political Impact of Migration" (POLECOMI). These data were collected through multi-sited election exit polls during the last Malian presidential elections, in July 2013, *i.e.* in the fragile democratic environment prevailing after the coup of 2012. The survey was designed so as to have three

---

<sup>2</sup> Three-fourths of the Malians living abroad live in Africa. Around 40% of Malian migrants live in Côte d'Ivoire (Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> At least by the international community.

<sup>4</sup> For more detail on this event, see Thurston (2013), Wing (2013), and Whitehouse (2012).

teams of surveyors in France, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali, all of them interviewing Malian voters exiting polling places the day of the first round of the elections. Among destination countries, France was chosen for being a competitive multiparty democracy, by contrast to Côte d'Ivoire which is generally considered as a defective democracy.<sup>5</sup> France and Côte d'Ivoire are also the main destination countries for Malian migrants, respectively in Europe and Africa. While the tradition of migration from Mali goes back to the precolonial period, the bulk of migration from Mali to Côte d'Ivoire and France occurred during the 1960s and 1970s due to the increase in the demand for labor force both in the cocoa and coffee plantations in Côte d'Ivoire and in the manufacturing sector in France. Migration flows to France were mainly composed of individuals coming from the region of Kayes, located in the Western part of the country, and belonging to the Soninke ethnic group (Gubert, 2000), whereas migrants to Côte d'Ivoire originated mostly from the South part of Mali (Sikasso region). While migration to both countries has evolved and now includes individuals from other regions and ethnic backgrounds, the Kayes area and the South part of Mali remain the main regions of origin of Malian migrants.

We find that Malian migrants display different political attitudes than their fellow non-migrant counterparts in Mali. More specifically, we find that their perceptions on Malian democracy and institutions differ from Malian non-migrants. Their interest for politics as well as their implication in political matters is also affected by their migration experience. Moreover, the extent to which Malian migrants trust (or distrust) the institutions of their home country and the interest they have for Malian political life are found to be strongly dependent on the country they reside in.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of the literature on social remittances and discuss the existing evidence on the relationship between migration experience and migrants' political attitudes. In Section 3, we present the exit poll data collected in the framework of the POLECOMI project, and describe our empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the results and provides some suggestive evidence on the channels that could drive our results. Section 5 concludes.

---

<sup>5</sup> France's Polity IV score was +9 in 2014 while that of Côte d'Ivoire was +4 the same year. Mali had a score of +7 until 2012 which has fallen to +4 since then. According to the Centre for Systematic Peace in charge of the Polity IV Project, the Polity scores can be converted into three regime categories : "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5) and "democracies" (+6 to +10). (cf. <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>).

## 2. Literature review

There is now an abundant literature exploring the many ways and means migration impacts on origin countries. The most widely explored dimension of migration is migrants' financial remittances. As the second largest source of external funding for developing countries, remittances have been recognized as supplementing the incomes of millions of poor families and significantly contributing to reduce poverty. However, remittances in cash or goods are not the only links between migrants and their families of origin. As underlined by Peggy Levitt in her 2001 book, *The Transnational Villagers*, migrants also facilitate the cross-border diffusion of ideas, identities, beliefs, knowledge, and behavior which are now commonly referred to as social remittances. The latter circulate in several ways: through phone calls, letters, or the internet; when migrants return to their homeland; or when conversely non-migrants come to visit their friends or parents in their country of residence.

Drawing upon Levitt's conceptual framework, several recent papers have investigated the issue of international migration as a channel for the diffusion of fertility norms (see, *e.g.*, Lindstrom and Saucedo, 2002; Fargues, 2007; Beine *et al.*, 2013; Bertoli and Marchetta, 2015). Other authors have examined the spillover effects of migration in terms of health knowledge (see, *e.g.*, Lindstrom and Munoz-France, 2006; McKenzie *et al.*, 2005; Holdaway *et al.*, 2015). With regards to political norms or ideas, the question of whether migration is one of the possible ways through which the diffusion of democracy might take place has for a long time been mostly debated in the transnational literature at the theoretical level and illustrated using specific migrants communities experiences (see, *e.g.*, Levitt, 2001; Morawska, 2001 and Lauth and Pickel, 2009 cited by Rüländ *et al.*, 2009). It is only recently that some quantitative analyses have been carried out.

Among economists, the diffusion of political norms has first been tested at the macroeconomic level (Li and McHale, 2006; Spilimbergo, 2009; Docquier *et al.*, 2011; Beine and Sekkat, 2011; Lodigiani and Salomone, 2012). Overall, these studies find that openness to emigration has a positive effect on home-country institutional development. However, they do not allow to properly identifying the mechanisms at work, and only mention the home countries' increased exposure to new political values and practices thanks to contacts with return migrants and relatives abroad as one possible channel. To some extent, the same holds true with micro studies using data on electoral outcomes (Omar Mahmoud *et al.*, 2012; Pfütze, 2012; Chauvet and Mercier, 2014): overall, they find that electoral outcomes vary depending on the intensity of migration or return migration at the locality level, without being fully

certain if this result can be interpreted as evidence of a diffusion of political norms and ideas by the migrants.<sup>6</sup> Other channels like an income effect induced by financial remittances can come into play and may interfere with the political transfer of norms mechanism.

One of the common underlying assumptions on which rest all these papers is that migration has the potential to alter or to strengthen migrants' political attitudes towards a more democratic direction. Indeed, a prerequisite for migrants to act as agents of change by channeling novel political beliefs and practices from their host country to their country of origin is that they themselves have had their beliefs and attitudes altered by their migration experience in the first place. As argued by Levitt (1998), however, not all migrants necessarily absorb all ideas in the same way, and the degree to which migrants' attitudes are altered depends upon their interaction with the host society. Using field work data collected in the city of Boston among Dominican migrants, Levitt identifies three broad patterns of interaction, which result in differentiated degree of attitudes alteration and of social remittance evolution. At one extreme are *recipient observers*, defined as individuals who mostly interact with their country fellows and take in new ideas and practices only by observing the world around them, reading the papers, and watching television. Given the limited interactions of the migrants with the host society, their norms and practices are therefore mainly unaltered. At the other extreme are *purposeful innovators*, defined as individuals who actively seek out new ideas, attitudes, and experiences. The migrants combine their original norms and values with those acquired in their host countries, leading through a *cross-pollination* to hybrid social norms (Levitt, 1998). *Instrumental adapters* stand in-between, and are defined as individuals who pragmatically acquire new skills and readjust their reference frame to better adapt to their new environment. Their original beliefs and values are unaltered by their migration experience, but they acquire new norms that they "[add] to their cultural repertoire" (Levitt, 1998: 932).

Following Levitt, a few authors have investigated whether contact with more democratic contexts through migration translates into democratic political attitudes in other contexts (de la Garza and Yetim, 2003; Camp, 2003; Pérez-Amendáriz and Crow, 2010; Rother, 2009; Careja and Emmenegger, 2012). Using data on a random sample of 650 voting-age Mexican citizens, Pérez-Amendáriz and Crow (2010) estimate multi-level logistic and linear regressions of political participation and attitudes on a set of individual characteristics

---

<sup>6</sup> One exception is Batista and Vicente (2011). Using a voting experiment and instrumental strategy, they show that international migration promotes better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability.

including a variable of migration experience. They find that having lived abroad, in the United States or in Canada, makes respondents more tolerant and more critical of the Mexican government's record on rights than their counterparts who have never lived abroad. But the rate of political participation of returnees is found to be indistinguishable from that of other Mexicans. In the framework of a research project entitled "Democratisation through migration?", Rother (2009) conducts the same kind of analysis on Filipino migrants. However, the investigation is pushed a little bit further than in Pérez-Amendáriz and Crow (*op.cit.*) through a comparison of former Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), coming back from various countries selected for being either democratic or authoritarian, with OFWs awaiting for their departure. The results suggest significant variation in the esteem returnees have for democratic values, personal freedom, labor rights, etc., depending on the country they come from. Those who personally benefited from the provision of rights relating to their situation during their stay (as is the case for OFWs who were in Hong-Kong) are found to be in higher agreement with democratic values than those who did not. In a similar vein, Careja and Emmenegger (2012) use data collected in 2002 among more than 10,000 individuals residing in Central and Eastern European countries to explore whether migrants returning from Western countries display different political attitudes than their fellow non-migrant citizens. They find a differentiated relationship between migration and political attitudes: while migrants and non-migrants show the same attitudes toward domestic politics, the two groups are found to differ with respect to their political participation, their satisfaction with how democracy works, and their interest for EU and foreign policy matters, with migrants participating more, being more satisfied, and more interested in politics than non-migrants. Moreover, only migration to established democracies is found to have a visible effect.

In sum, the existing evidence suggests that migration experience may contribute to shape migrants' political attitudes, in a way that has been found to depend on several factors. A strong limitation of this literature, however, is that endogeneity issues, while generally acknowledged, are not always properly dealt with. Some less democratic destinations may attract individuals who care less for democracy. More generally speaking, individuals may move abroad, because of their preference for democracy in the first place. Not taking this possibility into account may result in an over-estimation of the role of migration in shaping political attitudes. Our aim in this paper is thus to explore the impact of migration experience on migrants' political attitudes using an instrumentation strategy that correct for endogeneity. We do so with data on an African diaspora that, to our knowledge, has attracted little attention so far.

### 3. Data and Empirical Strategy

For the purpose of this research, we collected an original dataset on Malian voters interviewed in Mali, France, and Côte d'Ivoire during the first round of the last presidential election on July 28, 2013.<sup>7</sup> To this end, we put in place multi-sited exit polls in different places: three suburbs of Paris (France), namely Bagnole, Montreuil and Evry<sup>8</sup>; three communes located in the Northern part of Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), namely Abobo, Adjamé and Attécoubé; three localities in the region of Kayes - Kayes, Kenieba and Kita; and the communes I, IV and VI of Bamako (Mali).<sup>9</sup> The choice of France and Côte d'Ivoire was driven by the fact that both are the main destination countries of Malian migrants, respectively in Europe and Africa. The focus on the capital cities and their suburbs was justified by the density of Malian migrants and polling stations in these localities, which facilitated the fieldwork and allowed us to interview large numbers of migrants in only one day. In Mali, we targeted the capital city of Bamako, as well as some localities in the Kayes region because a majority of Malian migrants to France originates from these places. Moreover, we restricted the sample to cities and did not sample polling stations in rural areas to facilitate the supervision of the fieldwork.

The multi-sited exit polls were conceived so as to be perfectly comparable across countries. The survey includes a core questionnaire with the same questions asked to all respondents, independently of their country or place of residence, as well as specific additional modules for migrants and non-migrants. The core questionnaire includes modules on respondents' main characteristics, perception on Malian democracy and institutions, and interest for politics and political activities in Mali. Interviewees in France and Côte d'Ivoire had to answer additional modules on their perception on democracy and institutions in their host country, their political activities in the host country, and their connections with their homeland. Interviewees in Mali had to answer additional modules on their past migration experience (if ever), and their connections with members of their household living abroad.

The final sample used in our analyses is composed of 173 Malian voters in France, 208 in Côte d'Ivoire, and 673 in Mali (with 347 and 326 voters being respectively interviewed in Bamako and Kayes). Since our objective is to compare migrants to non-migrants, individuals

---

<sup>7</sup> This election happened more than one year after the coup d'état and six months after the establishment of a transitional government.

<sup>8</sup> The city of Bagnole hosts the Malian consulate.

<sup>9</sup> All the surveys were designed and supervised by the authors of the paper. For each survey, about ten investigators were involved. The field work was conducted in France by the authors of the paper and Jean-Philippe Dedieu. In Côte d'Ivoire it was conducted by Marion Mercier and Anda David. In Mali it was conducted by Arouna Sougane.

with a past migration experience, *i.e.* returnees, in the sample of Malians interviewed either in Bamako or Kayes are excluded from our analyses.<sup>10</sup>

In order to assess the impact of migration experience on migrants' political attitudes, we estimate the following general model:

$$POLITICAL_i = \alpha + \beta X_i + \delta MIGRANT_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $POLITICAL_i$  is meant to capture various dimensions of individual  $i$ 's political attitudes and perceptions of Malian institutions.  $X_i$  is a set of individual  $i$ 's characteristics and  $MIGRANT_i$  is our variable of interest which indicates whether individual  $i$  is currently living in France or in Côte d'Ivoire.

We assess the impact of migration on various dimensions of political attitudes and perceptions by estimating the model using 11 alternative dependent variables. The respondents' perception of Malian institutions is captured by the question of whether they tend to trust certain institutions including democracy ( $DEMOC_i$ ), politicians before the coup ( $POLITIC_i$ ), politicians after the coup ( $POLITIC2_i$ ), justice ( $JUSTICE_i$ ), the police ( $POLICE_i$ ), the media ( $MEDIA_i$ ), and the army ( $ARMY_i$ ). Answers are coded on a 4-point scale ranging from "I fully trust" (coded 1) to "I do not trust at all" (coded 4). We dichotomize the variables, with 1 indicating "full trust" and 0 otherwise.

Interest in politics is captured by four different variables: the first one is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent declares having a strong interest for Malian politics ( $INTEREST_i$ ); the second variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent had a strong interest for Malian 2013 elections ( $INTEREST2013_i$ ). Finally, the last two variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the respondent is close to a political party in Mali ( $CLOSEPOL_i$ ) and if he is a member of a political party in Mali ( $MEMBERPOL_i$ ).

Perceptions and interest in politics may be differently influenced by migration experience depending on the institutional context and media prevailing in the destination country. In order to capture these differences, we distinguish between migrants living in France  $MIGFRANCE_i$ , and migrants in Côte d'Ivoire,  $MIGIVOIRE_i$ . These two variables are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the respondent was surveyed in France and Côte d'Ivoire respectively (0 otherwise).

---

<sup>10</sup> These figures correspond to the number of fully-completed questionnaires, out of a total of 1,333 interviews. 172 people did not answer to all the modules and 107 returnees were excluded from our analyses.

Last, the set of control variables,  $X_i$ , includes the respondents' main characteristics that are likely to influence their perceptions and interest in politics. These variables are age, sex, ethnic group, education, and social background, which is captured by the question of whether respondents belong to the ruling or religious elite in their village of origin.<sup>11</sup> Controlling for these individual characteristics is important because they may not only explain differences in the political attitudes of the respondents, but also be correlated with their propensity to migrate and their destination choice: in this case, omitting them from the model would bias the estimated impact of migration on political attitudes. The propensity to migrate has indeed been shown to be strongly dependent on individual characteristics such as age or education. In the case of Mali, it is also determined by ethnicity and region of birth: as explained above, the Soninke originating from the Kayes region, in Western Mali, have a long-lasting tradition of migration to France while those coming from the Southern part of Mali (Sikasso region) are strongly over-represented in the migration flows to Côte d'Ivoire.

Controlling for age, education, and ethnicity may not be sufficient, though, to preclude any bias in the estimation of the coefficient of the migration variables. Malian migrants may indeed have some specific unobservable attributes, such as risk aversion, entrepreneurial mindset or, say, a preference for democracy, which may both affect their probability to leave Mali and their political attitudes. In that case, the estimated coefficients of  $MIGFRANCE_i$  and  $MIGIVOIRE_i$  would be plagued by endogeneity. We therefore implement an identification strategy in which  $MIGFRANCE_i$  and  $MIGIVOIRE_i$  are instrumented by individual characteristics that are unlikely to be correlated with political attitudes and perceptions, but are strongly correlated with migration status. More precisely, we use the information on respondents' birth order contained in the data to construct a dummy variable which is equal to one if the respondent is the eldest son (or was the eldest son at the time of migration), and 0 otherwise ( $ELDESTSON_i$ ). In Malian tradition indeed, the decision to migrate is generally taken collectively and is strongly influenced by one individual's household status. Sons of the head are more likely to migrate, and in line with law of primogeniture, eldest sons are more likely to migrate than their younger counterparts. We also use two dummy variables indicating if the respondent is the household head ( $HEAD_i$ ) or the spouse of the head

---

<sup>11</sup> Age is a categorical variable which distinguishes between the following age groups: 18-25, 25-35, 35-45, 45-60, 60-75, and 75 and more. We computed seven dummy variables relating to ethnic groups. The education variables were constructed using information on the highest class achieved. We distinguish between primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Finally, we built five dummy variables that are equal to one if the migrant belongs to the village headman's family, the village's founding family, the land chief's family, religious leader's family or a marabout's family.

( $SPOUSE_i$ ) as additional instruments for our migration variables. We use alternatively ordinary least square estimators (OLS) and two stage least squares models.<sup>12</sup>

Our estimations are run on three different sub-samples. We first compare Malian migrants living in France to non-migrants in Mali (excluding returnees). We then compare Malian migrants living in Côte d’Ivoire to non-migrants in Mali (again excluding returnees). Finally, we compare migrants in France to migrants in Côte d’Ivoire. This last specification on the subsample of migrants allows better exploring the differences between them, depending on their destination country. It also attenuates endogeneity biases that could remain despite our instrumentation strategy since comparing two groups of migrants partly solves the migration selection bias that occurs if the decision to migrate is correlated with some unobservable characteristics that also influence political attitudes. This strategy does not fully solve endogeneity issues, though, since migrants who have moved to France may have some unobservable characteristics that explain both why they chose France instead of Côte d’Ivoire and why they have specific political attitudes. In order to control for this potential bias, we instrument our variable of interest (“*Being a migrant in France*”) by dummy variables capturing the migrants’ region of birth since Malian regions display highly contrasted migration patterns.

Whatever their country of residence, migrants are found to share some specific characteristics that distinguish them from their non-migrant counterparts: they are indeed more males, older, and less educated on average (detailed statistics are provided in appendix, table A1). As an illustration, while 23% of the non-migrants have achieved tertiary education, this is only so for 16% and 7% of the migrants in France and Côte d’Ivoire respectively. The same holds true for secondary education. As a result, the share of individuals who never went to school is much higher among migrants than among non-migrants, and especially so for migrants in Côte d’Ivoire.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Non linear probit and IV probit models gave very similar results that are available upon request.

<sup>13</sup> The statistics provided in Table 1 also reveal how selected our sample of voters is. As an illustration, two thirds of the sampled (non-migrant) voters are men even though women and men were equally represented among voters at the last presidential elections. This can be partly explained by higher refusal rates among female voters who were asked to participate to our survey than among male voters. In a similar vein, the share of highly educated individuals in our sample of non-migrants is found to be much higher than the one observed in the general population. Part of this discrepancy certainly results from the over-representation of high-educated individuals among voters. But a bias in favor of the high-educated may also be present in our sample.

Turning to our dependent variables, Table 1 suggests that apart from a few exceptions, migrants in Côte d'Ivoire are characterized by higher levels of trust in Malian institutions than their non-migrant counterparts, while the reverse holds true for migrants in France. This stands as an indication that migration experience affects the political attitudes of migrants in ways that vary depending on the institutional environment prevailing in the host country. It may also indicate that more skeptical individuals favor migrating to France rather than to Côte d'Ivoire. Less clear patterns emerge from the variables aimed at capturing interest in politics. Overall, migrants are found to be on average more interested in Malian politics than their non-migrant counterparts, but are no more likely to be close to a Malian political party and less likely to be members of a Malian political party, which may reflect the difficulties of being actively involved in long-distance politics. However, before drawing strong conclusions, it is worthwhile to test whether these findings hold when controlling for the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics.

**Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables**

	Name of the variables	Non migrants	Migrants in France	Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire	All
<b>High level of trust in... (Yes=1)</b>					
...Malian democracy	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	0.21 (0.41)	0.25 (0.43)	0.41 (0.49)	0.26 (0.44)
...Malian politicians (before the coup)	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	0.13 (0.33)	0.13 (0.34)	0.27 (0.44)	0.16 (0.36)
...Malian politicians (after the coup)	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	0.35 (0.48)	0.16 (0.37)	0.37 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)
...Malian justice	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	0.18 (0.38)	0.11 (0.31)	0.28 (0.45)	0.18 (0.39)
...Malian police	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	0.28 (0.45)	0.13 (0.34)	0.33 (0.47)	0.26 (0.44)
...Malian media	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	0.31 (0.46)	0.22 (0.41)	0.26 (0.44)	0.29 (0.45)
...Malian army	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	0.43 (0.50)	0.24 (0.43)	0.31 (0.46)	0.38 (0.48)
<b>High interest in... (Yes=1)</b>					
...Malian politics	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	0.37 (0.48)	0.58 (0.49)	0.45 (0.50)	0.42 (0.49)
...Malian 2013 elections	<i>INTEREST2013<sub>i</sub></i>	0.72 (0.45)	0.82 (0.39)	0.56 (0.50)	0.70 (0.46)
Close to a Malian political party	<i>CLOSEPOL<sub>i</sub></i>	0.58 (0.49)	0.58 (0.50)	0.59 (0.49)	0.58 (0.49)
Member of a Malian political party	<i>MEMBERPOL<sub>i</sub></i>	0.33 (0.47)	0.27 (0.44)	0.21 (0.41)	0.30 (0.46)
<b>Number of observations</b>		673	173	208	1,054

Standard deviations in parentheses.

## 4. Results

Estimation results are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2 (respectively Table 3) displays the results of the regressions of our eleven dependent variables on a dummy variable for whether the respondent is a migrant in France (resp. Côte d'Ivoire). In both cases, the comparison group is made of the sampled non-migrants after excluding returnees. Table 4 displays the results of the regressions of the same set of outcome variables on a dummy variable for whether the respondent is a migrant in France using migrants in Côte d'Ivoire as the comparison group. In each table, Panel A displays the regression results obtained after OLS estimations, while Panel B displays the regression results obtained after two-stage least squares estimations. Columns (1) to (7) show the estimated impact of migration experience on the level of trust in Malian institutions, while columns (8) to (11) show the estimated impact of migration experience on interest in domestic politics.<sup>14</sup>

Overall, the results suggest that respondents interviewed in France are characterized by lower levels of trust in Malian institutions than their non-migrant counterparts: the coefficient of the migration variable is negative in six out of seven regressions (see columns (1) to (7)) and significantly different from zero in five out of seven regressions. More importantly, these results hold after instrumenting  $MIGFRANCE_i$ , and the size of the coefficients slightly increases (Panel B). However, migration experience does not affect trust in Malian democracy (col. (1)) or in Malian politicians before the *coup d'état* (col. (2)).

As regards interest in politics (columns (8) to (11)), migrants in France are found to be more interested in Malian politics in general and to have had more interest for the 2013 presidential elections than their non-migrant counterparts, but this result does not hold when migration experience is instrumented and should thus be considered with caution.

If we now turn to migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, we find contrasted results. Panel A of Table 3 shows indeed that when compared with their non-migrant counterparts, respondents interviewed in Côte d'Ivoire have higher levels of trust in Malian democracy and in various Malian institutions including justice and the police while at the same time having a lower level of trust in the army. However, once instrumented, migration experience is no more significant, except in columns (1), (3) and (7). This suggests that respondents in Côte d'Ivoire

---

<sup>14</sup> Results of the first-stage equations are displayed in columns (1) and (2) of Table A4 in the Appendix. Being a migrant is found to be positively correlated with being the eldest son and negatively correlated with being the household head or his spouse. However, some tests are weak and sometimes reject the validity of the instruments. This is the case for the regressions on  $POLICE_i$ ,  $MEDIA_i$  and  $INTEREST2013_i$ . This casts doubt on some of our results, which should thus be considered with caution.

tend to be more satisfied with the way democracy works in their home country than their non-migrant counterparts (col. (1)), while at the same time distrusting more the politicians (col. (3)) and the army (col. (7)). These last finding is the only one that is common to migrants in France and migrants in Côte d'Ivoire. Most of the other results suggest that not every migration experience affects the political attitudes of migrants in significant ways, a finding that is in line with those of other papers (see, among others, Careja and Emmenegger, 2012). Last, columns (8) to (11) of Panel B suggest that migrants in Côte d'Ivoire are less interested and less involved in Malian politics than their non-migrant counterparts, but only significantly so in column (9) which relates to the 2013 presidential elections.

The results relating to the control variables are displayed in Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix. Table A2 provides the 2SLS estimates obtained on the sample composed of migrants in France and non-migrants, while Table A3 provides the 2SLS estimates obtained on the sample composed of migrants in Côte d'Ivoire and non-migrants. Overall, the results suggest that male respondents are more interested in Malian politics and have higher levels of trust in Malian institutions than their female counterparts. But the coefficient is only significant in two out of 11 regressions in Table A2 and in three out of 11 regressions in Table A3. In both models, education is found to be positively correlated with individuals' interest in politics, whatever the chosen outcome: educated individuals are indeed more likely to declare being close to or member of a Malian political party than individuals with no education, and show a stronger interest in Malian politics in general. With regards to their perceptions of Malian institutions, by contrast, they show quite similar levels of trust, except for the army (and the police in Table A3) that they distrust much more than their non-educated counterparts. No clear pattern emerges from the other control variables. Belonging to the local ruling or religious elite does not lead to an increased interest in politics. It does not alter perceptions either, with a few exceptions. The same holds true with regards to age and ethnicity, which tend to have no effect on our outcome variables (with again a few exceptions).

Finally, Table 4 displays the results of the regressions of the same set of outcome variables on a dummy variable for whether the respondent is a migrant in France using migrants in Côte d'Ivoire as the comparison group. This last table is meant to go further in the understanding of the way the political and institutional context prevailing in the host country affects migrants' perceptions and interest in domestic politics. In Panel A, the choice of destination is assumed to be exogenous to perceptions, while in Panel B, it is instrumented using regions of birth as

instruments as migration patterns in Mali strongly vary between regions.<sup>15</sup> Overall and as already suggested by the results displayed in Tables 3 and 4, migrants in France are found to be much more distrustful towards Malian institutions than their Ivoirian counterparts, and much more interested in Malian politics. Results from Panel A and B are very close, suggesting a small downward endogeneity bias.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Column (3) of Table A4 in Appendix displays the results of the first-stage equation. As expected, being born in the Kayes region is positively and significantly correlated to being a migrant in France whereas being from all the other regions (except from Bamako) is negatively associated with being a migrant in France. The validity of our set of instruments is not rejected, as shown by the tests produced at the end of Table 4.

<sup>16</sup> Due to space limitations, the results obtained for the control variables are not shown but are available upon request. Education is found to have a significant effect in most regressions, and is generally associated with lower levels of trust in Malian institutions and higher interest in politics. The other variables show less clear patterns.

**Table 2. Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST 2013<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE POL<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEMBER POL<sub>i</sub></i>
<b>Panel A – OLS</b>											
<i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	0.056 (1.37)	-0.021 (-0.62)	-0.184 (-4.06)***	-0.064 (-1.76)*	-0.124 (-2.95)***	-0.125 (-2.82)***	-0.166 (-3.50)***	0.223 (4.74)***	0.159 (3.70)***	0.014 (0.29)	-0.066 (-1.44)
Pseudo R2	0.031	0.011	0.069	0.029	0.052	0.051	0.053	0.073	0.046	0.037	0.029
Number of obs.	852	853	846	851	852	851	852	856	855	855	855
<b>Panel B – Two-stage least squares</b>											
<i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	0.071 (0.73)	-0.119 (-1.50)	-0.250 (-2.30)**	-0.223 (-2.55)***	-0.251 (-2.50)**	-0.256 (-2.42)**	-0.479 (-4.13)***	0.095 (0.86)	0.054 (0.53)	-0.117 (-1.03)	-0.185 (-1.71)*
Centered R2	0.031	0.000	0.066	0.005	0.040	0.040	0.003	0.065	0.039	0.027	0.020
F statistic	1.16	0.53	2.33	1.28	1.97	1.96	2.31	2.10	1.26	1.51	1.19
Underidentif. test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Weak ident. test	58.390	58.825	57.317	58.130	58.568	58.568	58.551	60.360	59.810	60.127	59.683
5% threshold	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91
Sargan (p-value)	0.882	0.605	0.469	0.352	0.014	0.015	0.201	0.661	0.044	0.926	0.957
Number of obs.	847	848	841	846	847	847	847	851	850	850	850

<sup>(1)</sup> The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Student’s t in parentheses

Additional controls include sex, ethnic groups, regions of birth, age, education variables and dummy variables for whether the respondent belongs to the ruling or religious local elite. The list of instruments includes the eldest son dummy and link with household head.

**Table 3. Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire vs. Non-migrants**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST</i> <i>2013<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE</i> <i>POL<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEMBER</i> <i>POL<sub>i</sub></i>
<b>Panel A – OLS</b>											
<i>MIGIVOIRE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	0.235 (5.98)***	0.139 (4.15)***	-0.019 (-0.44)	0.111 (3.02)***	0.073 (1.73)*	-0.050 (-1.18)	-0.133 (-2.97)***	0.063 (1.50)	-0.141 (-3.49)***	-0.001 (-0.01)	-0.052 (-1.31)
Pseudo R2	0.073	0.046	0.031	0.035	0.026	0.038	0.040	0.050	0.079	0.054	0.051
Number of obs.	898	897	912	889	887	888	892	928	919	926	922
<b>Panel A – Two-stage least squares</b>											
<i>MIGIVOIRE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	0.233 (2.63)**	0.065 (0.86)	-0.176 (-1.81)*	0.006 (0.07)	-0.048 (-0.49)	-0.150 (-1.55)	-0.434 (-4.13)***	-0.103 (-1.09)	-0.169 (-1.89)*	-0.070 (-0.73)	-0.105 (-1.17)
Centered R2	0.073	0.041	0.015	0.025	0.017	0.031	-0.010	0.034	0.082	0.052	0.052
F statistic	1.74	1.14	1.38	0.96	0.91	1.59	1.94	2.09	3.14	2.37	2.26
Underidentif. test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Weak ident. test	70.572	70.970	71.070	67.723	66.673	67.048	67.419	73.768	75.580	74.067	72.584
5% threshold	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91
Sargan test (p value)	0.877	0.315	0.082	0.112	0.002	0.031	0.204	0.353	0.107	0.637	0.691
Number of obs.	894	893	907	885	883	884	888	923	914	922	918

<sup>(1)</sup> The reference category is “Being a non-migrant”

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Student’s t in parentheses

Additional controls include sex, ethnic groups, regions of birth, age, education variables and dummy variables for whether the respondent belongs to the ruling or religious local elite. The list of instruments includes the eldest son dummy and link with household head.

**Table 4. Migrants in France vs. Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST 2013<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE POL<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEMBER POL<sub>i</sub></i>
<b>Panel A – OLS</b>											
<i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	-0.192 (-3.33)***	-0.171 (-3.46)***	-0.210 (-3.92)***	-0.190 (-3.90)***	-0.211 (-4.08)***	-0.082 (-1.55)	-0.064 (-1.16)	0.095 (1.64)	0.248 (4.53)***	-0.014 (-0.25)	-0.028 (-0.56)
Pseudo R2	0.097	0.088	0.095	0.104	0.125	0.083	0.068	0.103	0.141	0.088	0.089
Number of obs.	401	401	407	391	390	390	395	437	427	434	430
<b>Panel B – Two-stage least squares</b>											
<i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	-0.268 (-2.57)**	-0.277 (-3.07)***	-0.215 (-2.02)**	-0.249 (-2.80)***	-0.262 (-2.80)***	-0.038 (-0.40)	-0.198 (-1.96)**	0.251 (2.20)**	0.197 (1.89)*	0.173 (1.50)	0.017 (0.18)
Centered R2	0.090	0.071	0.092	0.094	0.118	0.081	0.050	0.084	0.138	0.060	0.086
F statistic	1.62	1.46	1.30	1.51	1.92	1.40	1.29	2.14	2.15	1.74	1.76
Underidentif. test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Weak ident. test	21.986	21.623	17.090	20.786	21.168	20.835	22.026	19.86	19.86	19.214	19.86
5% threshold	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29	11.29
Sargan (p value)	0,249	0,370	0,152	0,641	0,615	0,369	0,619	0,252	0,880	0,302	0,932
Number of obs.	401	401	409	391	390	390	395	435	425	432	428

<sup>(1)</sup> The reference category is “Being a Malian migrant in Côte d'Ivoire”.

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Student's t in parentheses.

Additional controls include sex, ethnic groups, regions of birth, age, education variables and dummy variables for whether the respondent belongs to the ruling or religious local elite. The list of instruments includes the eldest son dummy and link with household head.

The above results suggest that migrant voters have different political attitudes and perceptions than their non-migrant counterparts, and that the differences depend on the country they reside in. This suggests in turn that the institutional characteristics of the country of destination matter.

As suggested by Levitt, changes in individual political attitudes and perceptions also depend on the capacity and willingness of the migrants themselves to learn and adopt the values and norms of their host country. The degree to which their initial beliefs and ideas are altered is a function of their interaction with the host country's population which is likely to vary depending on their socio-economic characteristics and the cultural distance between them and the host society. Another channel through which migration might induce changes in political beliefs relates to the economic improvement it brings to migrants. Indeed, when individuals increase their personal economic resources in migration, they may be tempted to adopt the values and ideas of the country that they perceived as being the source of this expansion.

In order to see whether our data meet these assumptions, we compute simple descriptive statistics to see whether and to what extent migrants' appetite for democracy and skepticism towards their home country institutions vary according to some of their characteristics and the intensity of their interactions with the host society. As an indicator of socialization with the host country, we use migrants' host country media consumption as the latter is expected to trigger the adoption of new values and ideas. We also use a dummy variable for whether the migrant is a member of a trade union in the host country. Being a union member suggests indeed that the migrant has assimilated, that he is "politically incorporated" and that he has learnt the skills and commitments of democratic citizenship. Turning to the migrants' individual characteristics, we first use their level of education as a *proxy* for both their income level and their capacity and/or willingness to absorb news norms. Higher-educated migrants are expected to better integrate in their new environment as it is easier for them to find a job. Moreover, the kind of job they get is likely to make them more exposed to the cultural norms of their host country. Education is also likely to affect the composition of their network which may comprise relatively more educated non-migrant individuals than in the case of less-educated migrants. Finally, we characterize the place of residence of migrants to approximate to what extent they live in ethnic clusters or not. More precisely, for Malian migrants living in France – there is no equivalent in Côte d'Ivoire – we account for whether the individuals live in a 'foyer'. Almost one-fourth of our sample of migrants in France is concerned. 'Foyers' are residences in which migrants can rent a room (subsidized by the State) and share the facilities.

This type of infrastructure is meant to help isolated migrants settle when they arrive in France. While it was meant as a temporary solution, the difficulty to find an alternative has sometimes led migrants to live in ‘foyers’ for many years. ‘Foyers’ most of the time gather migrants from the same origin country. It provides an information on how isolated the migrants are – most of the time ‘foyers’ are meant for single men, without their family – but also on how apart from the host population the migrants live.

Tables 5 and 6 provide, for each of our 11 measures of political attitudes and perceptions, its average value according to whether migrants in France (Table 5) and Côte d’Ivoire (Table 6) get informed on French (respectively Ivoirian) political affairs by watching TV, reading newspapers, or listening to the radio; have tertiary education; are member of a union; and live in a foyer (for the French sample only).

Interestingly enough, Table 5 first shows that 80% (101 out of 126) of the migrants interviewed in France “use” French media to get informed about politics in France. Being exposed to French media is correlated to a stronger interest in French political affairs together with a higher level of skepticism towards Malian institutions and politicians and a higher interest in Malian politics, as shown by the differences in the means of our variables of interest between the two sub-samples. The same comparison between highly-educated migrants and less or no educated ones shows a much higher skepticism towards Malian institutions in the former group than in the latter one. As an illustration, only 4% of the highly-educated migrants trust Malian democracy, as compared to 29% of the migrants with lower level of education. Being highly-educated is also found to be associated with having a higher interest in Malian politics, as well as a higher propensity to be close to, or a member of, a Malian political party. The third *proxy* that we use to capture migrants’ level of interaction with their host society is whether they are involved in some kind of activism through membership to a union. Again, being a unionist is found to be associated with higher skepticism towards Malian institutions and slightly higher interest in Malian politics.

The last dimension that we examine relates to the living conditions of Malians in France. As expected, Malian migrants who do not live in a ‘foyer’ and are likely to have more contact with the host society tend to be more distrustful towards Malian institutions (especially justice, the police the media and the army) and politicians than their counterparts living in foyer. However, the difference in means between the two-subsamples is less significant than for the other variables. This lower significance may be due to the fact that migrants who live in “foyer” have some specific characteristics that partly offset their relative isolation. This is left for further investigation.

In Table 6, we present similar descriptive statistics for Malian migrants living in Côte d'Ivoire. Contrary to what is observed with migrants in France, getting informed on Ivoirian political affairs *via* Ivoirian media does not make much of a difference in terms of trust or distrust towards Malian institutions. This probably relates to the low quality and low reliability of Ivoirian media especially since the start of the Ivoirian political crisis. As a result, Ivoirian media do not really contribute to enhance migrants' free will and critical sense. By contrast, being highly-educated is, as for the French sample, found to be key in illustrating how the assimilation of individuals to their new environment may transform into the adoption of new political references. While Malian migrants living in Côte d'Ivoire are found to be on average less skeptical towards Malian institutions than their non-migrants counterparts, Table 6 shows that this is not true for the highly-educated ones whose perception of Malian institutions is on average much more critical. Highly-educated Malian migrants living in Côte d'Ivoire are also more interested in politics and more likely to be close to and member of a political party. The same holds true for unionists.

Overall, the results of Tables 5 and 6 thus provide suggestive evidence that depending on their personal attributes and living conditions, migrants are more or less likely to actively adopt new norms while in migration. They underline that migration *per se* is not enough to change opinions and behaviors. The degree of interaction and assimilation in the host society is critical for this adoption of norms to occur.

**Table 5. Characteristics of migrants in France**

	Non migrants	Migrants in France							
		With access to media in France <sup>(1)</sup>	Without access to media in France <sup>(2)</sup>	With tertiary education	Without tertiary education	Union member	Not a union member	Lives in "foyer"	Does not live in "foyer"
<b>High level of trust in...</b>									
...Malian democracy	0.21 (0.41)	0.22 (0.42)	0.32 (0.47)	0.04 (0.19)	0.29 (0.45)	0.27 (0.45)	0.23 (0.42)	0.24 (0.43)	0.25 (0.44)
...Malian politicians (before the <i>coup</i> )	0.13 (0.33)	0.11 (0.31)	0.20 (0.41)	0.04 (0.19)	0.15 (0.36)	0.15 (0.36)	0.12 (0.33)	0.21 (0.41)	0.11 (0.32)
...Malian politicians (after the <i>coup</i> )	0.35 (0.48)	0.17 (0.38)	0.14 (0.35)	0.12 (0.33)	0.17 (0.38)	0.13 (0.34)	0.19 (0.39)	0.11 (0.31)	0.18 (0.39)
...Malian Justice	0.18 (0.38)	0.06 (0.23)	0.25 (0.44)	0.00 (0.00)	0.13 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	0.11 (0.32)	0.16 (0.37)	0.09 (0.29)
...Malian police	0.28 (0.45)	0.12 (0.33)	0.16 (0.37)	0.04 (0.19)	0.15 (0.36)	0.05 (0.23)	0.19 (0.40)	0.16 (0.37)	0.13 (0.33)
...Malian media	0.31 (0.46)	0.20 (0.40)	0.26 (0.44)	0.04 (0.19)	0.25 (0.43)	0.16 (0.37)	0.26 (0.44)	0.27 (0.45)	0.20 (0.40)
... Malian army	0.43 (0.50)	0.22 (0.41)	0.30 (0.46)	0.23 (0.43)	0.24 (0.43)	0.15 (0.36)	0.31 (0.46)	0.34 (0.48)	0.21 (0.41)
<b>High interest in...</b>									
...Malian politics	0.37 (0.48)	0,56 (0,50)	0,66 (0,48)	0.67 (0.48)	0.57 (0.50)	0.66 (0.48)	0.53 (0.50)	0.61 (0.50)	0.58 (0.50)
...Malian 2013 election	0.72 (0.45)	0,80 (0,40)	0,86 (0,35)	0.89 (0.32)	0.80 (0.40)	0.82 (0.38)	0.81 (0.40)	0.82 (0.39)	0.81 (0.39)
Close to a political party	0.58 (0.49)	0,54 (0,50)	0,67 (0,47)	0.70 (0.47)	0.55 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.59 (0.50)	0.53 (0.51)	0.59 (0.49)
Mb. of a political party	0.33 (0.47)	0,26 (0,44)	0,30 (0,46)	0.42 (0.50)	0.24 (0.43)	0.27 (0.45)	0.27 (0.44)	0.16 (0.37)	0.30 (0.46)
<b>Number of observations</b>	673	101	25	27	146	74	99	38	135

Standard deviations in parentheses.

(1) Migrants who watch TV and/or read newspapers and/or listen to the radio or other media to get informed about French political affairs.

(2) Migrants who do not "consume" any medium

**Table 6. Characteristics of migrants in Côte d'Ivoire**

	Non migrants	Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire					
		With access to media in Côte d'Ivoire <sup>(1)</sup>	Without access to media in Côte d'Ivoire <sup>(2)</sup>	With tertiary education	Without tertiary education	Union member	Not a union member
<b>High level of trust in...</b>							
...Malian democracy	0.21 (0.41)	0.42 (0.50)	0.41 (0.49)	0.40 (0.51)	0.41 (0.49)	0.25 (0.45)	0.43 (0.50)
...Malian politicians (before the <i>coup</i> )	0.13 (0.33)	0.26 (0.44)	0.27 (0.45)	0.00 (0.00)	0.29 (0.45)	0.08 (0.29)	0.28 (0.45)
...Malian politicians (after the <i>coup</i> )	0.35 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)	0.39 (0.49)	0.33 (0.49)	0.37 (0.49)	0.17 (0.39)	0.39 (0.49)
...Malian Justice	0.18 (0.38)	0.30 (0.46)	0.26 (0.44)	0.07 (0.26)	0.30 (0.46)	0.08 (0.29)	0.30 (0.46)
...Malian police	0.28 (0.45)	0.35 (0.48)	0.31 (0.47)	0.13 (0.35)	0.35 (0.48)	0.25 (0.45)	0.34 (0.47)
...Malian media	0.31 (0.46)	0.27 (0.45)	0.24 (0.43)	0.13 (0.35)	0.27 (0.44)	0.08 (0.29)	0.27 (0.44)
... Malian army	0.43 (0.50)	0.31 (0.46)	0.31 (0.46)	0.07 (0.26)	0.33 (0.47)	0.17 (0.39)	0.32 (0.47)
<b>High interest in...</b>							
...Malian politics	0.37 (0.48)	0.38 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.67 (0.49)	0.44 (0.50)	0.83 (0.39)	0.43 (0.50)
...Malian 2013 election	0.72 (0.45)	0.54 (0.50)	0.58 (0.50)	0.93 (0.26)	0.53 (0.50)	0.83 (0.39)	0.54 (0.50)
<b>Close to a political party</b>	0.58 (0.49)	0.54 (0.50)	0.64 (0.48)	0.93 (0.26)	0.56 (0.50)	0.83 (0.39)	0.57 (0.50)
<b>Mb. of a political party</b>	0.33 (0.47)	0.22 (0.42)	0.21 (0.41)	0.40 (0.51)	0.20 (0.40)	0.58 (0.51)	0.19 (0.39)
<b>Number of observations</b>	673	129	26	15	193	12	195

Standard deviations in parentheses.

(1) Migrants who watch TV and/or read newspapers and/or listen to the radio or other media to get informed about Ivoirian political affairs.

(2) Migrants who do not “consume” any medium.

## 5. Conclusion

In this article, we examine whether migration experience provides an opportunity for Malian migrants to learn and adopt new political values and norms, and whether this translates into different attitudes towards domestic politics and institutions. We use an original multi-sited exit-poll survey which was conducted during the Malian 2013 presidential election in Mali, France, and Côte d'Ivoire to investigate whether Malian migrants have different perceptions and political behavior than their non-migrant counterparts. By distinguishing between Malian migrants living in France and Côte d'Ivoire, we provide evidence that not only migrants have different perceptions of Malian democratic institutions than non-migrants, but also that the institutional context of the host country matters for the adoption of political norms

However, it is necessary to specify that our findings may overestimate the impact of migration on political opinions and attitudes as our empirical study has been conducted on a sample of voting migrants. They are probably more interested in politics than those who did not go to vote. Finally, this paper does not exactly investigate how powerful a mechanism migration is in the transmission of political norms but it suggests that migration drives such a kind of social remittances by showing that migrants' political opinions are impacted by the institutional context of their host countries.

## References

- Batista. C. & Vicente. P. (2011). Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment. *The World Bank Economic Review* 25 (1): 77-104.
- Beine. M., Docquier. F., & Schiff. M. (2013). International migration, transfer of norms and home country fertility. *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique*. 46(4). 1406-1430.
- Beine. M., & Sekkat. K. (2013). Skilled migration and the transfer of institutional norms. *IZA Journal of Migration*. 2(1). 1-19.
- Bertoli. S., & Marchetta. F. (2015). Bringing It All Back Home—Return Migration and Fertility Choices. *World Development*. 65. 27-40.
- Camp. R. A. (2003). Learning democracy in Mexico and the United States. *Mexican Studies*. 19(1). 3-27.
- Careja. R., & Emmenegger. P. (2012). Making Democratic Citizens The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*. 45(7). 875-902.
- Chauvet. L., Gubert. F. & Mesplé-Somps. S. (2013). “Transferts migratoires et democratization”. in P. Gonin, N. Kotlok and M-A. Pérouse de Montclos (eds). *La Tragédie Malienne*. Edition Vendémiaire. Paris. 2013.
- De la Garza. R. O., & Yetim. M. (2003). The impact of ethnicity and socialization on definitions of democracy: The case of Mexican Americans and Mexicans. *Mexican Studies*. 19(1). 81-104.
- Dedieu. J-P. (2013). “Mali’s Scattered Democracy. How Migrants from Paris to Guangzhou Influence the Vote.” *Foreign Affairs*. August 12. 2013. Electronic format.
- Dedieu. J-P., Chauvet. L., Gubert. F., Mesplé-Somps. S. and Smith. E. (2013). The “Battles” of Paris and New York. an Analysis of the Transnational Electoral Behaviour of Senegalese Immigrants in France and the United States, *Revue française de Sciences Politiques*. 63(5). 865-892.
- Docquier. F., Lodigiani. E., Rapoport. H. & Schiff. M. (2011). Emigration and democracy. *IZA Discussion Paper* n° 5496.
- Gubert. F. (2000). *Migration as a collective risk-coping strategy. Evidence from the Kayes area (Western Mali)*. Ph.D. thesis. University of Auvergne.
- Holdaway. J., Levitt. P., Fang. J., & Rajaram. N. (2015). Mobility and health sector development in China and India. *Social Science & Medicine*. 130. 268-276.
- Kapur. D. & McHale. J. (2005). Give us your best and brightest: The global hunt for talent and its impact on the developing world. Center for Global Development
- Kapur D. (2010) *Diaspora. Development and Democracy. the Domestic Impact of International Migration from India*. Princeton University Press. 325 p.
- Lauth. H. J., & Pickel. G. (2009). Diffusion der Demokratie—Transfer eines erfolgreichen Modells. *Externe Faktoren der Demokratisierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos*. 37-74.
- Levitt. P. (1998). Social remittances: Migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. *International migration review*. 926-948.

- Levitt. P. (2001). *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 296p.
- Li X. and J. McHale. 2006. "Does brain drain lead to institutional gain? A cross country empirical investigation". *Manuscript: Queen University*.
- Lindstrom. D. P.. & Munoz-Franco. E. (2006). Migration and maternal health services utilization in rural Guatemala. *Social Science & Medicine*. 63(3). 706-721.
- Lindstrom. D. P.. & Saucedo. S. G. (2002). The short-and long-term effects of US migration experience on Mexican women's fertility. *Social Forces*. 80(4). 1341-1368.
- Lodigiani. E.. & Salomone. S. (2012). Migration-Induced Transfers of Norms: The Case of Female Political Empowerment. *Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano Development Studies Working Paper*. (343).
- Mahmoud. O.T.. Rapoport. H.. Steinmayr. A.. & Trebesch. C. (2013). The effect of labor migration on the diffusion of democracy: evidence from a former Soviet Republic. CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1320.
- Morawska. E. (2002). International migration and the consolidation of democracy'. *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and Transnational Factors. Oxford Studies in Democratisation*. 2. 163-191.
- Pérez-Armendáriz. C.. & Crow. D. (2009). Do migrants remit democracy? International migration. political beliefs. and behavior in Mexico. *Comparative political studies*. 43(1) : 119-148.
- Pfütze T.. 2012. "Does Migration Promote Democratization? Evidence from the Mexican transition". *Journal of Comparative Economics* 40 (2):159-175.
- Rother. S. (2009). Changed in migration? Philippine return migrants and (un) democratic remittances. *European journal of East Asian studies*. 8(2). 245-274.
- Rüland. J.. Kessler. C.. & Rother. S. (2009). Democratisation through international migration? Explorative thoughts on a novel research agenda. *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. 8(2). 161-179.
- Sougane. A. (2015). Migrations et transferts au Mali : un état des lieux. in J. Charmes. D. Konaté. J. Brunet-Jailly. (eds) *Le Mali contemporain*. Editions IRD and Editions Tombouctou. 613-642.
- Spilimbergo. A. (2009). Democracy and foreign education. *The American Economic Review*. 528-543.
- Thurston A. (2013), Mali: The Disintegration of a "Model African Democracy", *Stability*, 2(1). 1-7.
- Whitehouse, B. (2012). What Went Wrong with Mali? *London Review of Books* 34 (16): August.
- Wing S. D. (2013). Mali: Politics of a crisis, *African Affairs*, 448.

## APPENDIX

**Table A1. Respondents' main socio-economic characteristics**

	Non migrants	Migrants in France	Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire	All
<b>Male</b>	0.66 (0.47)	0.84 (0.37)	0.88 (0.33)	0.73 (0.44)
<b>Age category</b>				
<b>[18 - 25 [</b>	0.26 (0.44)	0.03 (0.17)	0.09 (0.29)	0.19 (0.39)
<b>[25 - 35 [</b>	0.35 (0.48)	0.21 (0.41)	0.34 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)
<b>[35 - 45 [</b>	0.19 (0.39)	0.40 (0.49)	0.26 (0.44)	0.24 (0.42)
<b>[45-60 [</b>	0.11 (0.32)	0.29 (0.45)	0.22 (0.42)	0.16 (0.37)
<b>[60 - 75 [</b>	0.05 (0.22)	0.07 (0.25)	0.07 (0.26)	0.06 (0.23)
<b>75 or more</b>	0.04 (0.19)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.16)
<b>Level of education</b>				
<b>None</b>	0.20 (0.40)	0.34 (0.47)	0.57 (0.50)	0.29 (0.46)
<b>Primary</b>	0.29 (0.45)	0.30 (0.46)	0.26 (0.44)	0.28 (0.45)
<b>Secondary</b>	0.28 (0.45)	0.21 (0.41)	0.10 (0.30)	0.23 (0.42)
<b>Tertiary</b>	0.23 (0.42)	0.16 (0.36)	0.07 (0.26)	0.19 (0.39)
<b>Region of birth</b>				
<b>Bamako</b>	0.32 (0.47)	0.26 (0.44)	0.11 (0.31)	0.27 (0.44)
<b>Kayes</b>	0.41 (0.49)	0.54 (0.50)	0.08 (0.27)	0.37 (0.48)
<b>Koulikoro</b>	0.08 (0.27)	0.05 (0.22)	0.20 (0.40)	0.10 (0.30)
<b>Sikasso</b>	0.05 (0.22)	0.02 (0.13)	0.14 (0.35)	0.06 (0.24)
<b>Segou</b>	0.07 (0.25)	0.05 (0.22)	0.11 (0.31)	0.07 (0.26)
<b>Mopti</b>	0.04 (0.20)	0.00 (0.00)	0.25 (0.43)	0.08 (0.27)
<b>Gao / Mopti/ Kidal</b>	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.11)	0.03 (0.18)	0.02 (0.14)
<b>Abroad</b>	0.01 (0.12)	0.06 (0.24)	0.08 (0.27)	0.04 (0.19)
<b>Number of observations</b>	673	173	208	1,054

Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table A1. (continued)**

	<b>Non migrants</b>	<b>Migrants in France</b>	<b>Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>All</b>
<b>Ethnicity (Mother's tongue)</b>				
<b>Bambara</b>	0.54 (0.50)	0.36 (0.48)	0.33 (0.47)	0.47 (0.50)
<b>Malinke</b>	0.18 (0.38)	0.03 (0.17)	0.13 (0.34)	0.14 (0.35)
<b>Peul</b>	0.07 (0.25)	0.05 (0.21)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.25)
<b>Sonraï/Djerma</b>	0.04 (0.19)	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.12)	0.03 (0.16)
<b>Dogon</b>	0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.08)	0.19 (0.39)	0.06 (0.23)
<b>Soninke</b>	0.08 (0.27)	0.44 (0.50)	0.13 (0.34)	0.15 (0.36)
<b>Khassonke</b>	0.01 (0.11)	0.03 (0.17)	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.13)
<b>Other</b>	0.06 (0.24)	0.08 (0.26)	0.12 (0.32)	0.07 (0.26)
<b>Belongs to... (Yes=1)</b>				
<b>...the village headman's family</b>	0.21 (0.40)	0.29 (0.45)	0.35 (0.48)	0.25 (0.43)
<b>...the village's founding family</b>	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.03)
<b>...the land chief's family</b>	0.14 (0.35)	0.19 (0.39)	0.33 (0.47)	0.19 (0.39)
<b>...a religious leader's family</b>	0.12 (0.33)	0.21 (0.41)	0.21 (0.41)	0.16 (0.36)
<b>...a marabout's family</b>	0.11 (0.31)	0.12 (0.32)	0.17 (0.38)	0.12 (0.33)
<b>Number of observations</b>	673	173	208	1,054

Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table A2. Migrants in France vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>2013i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSEPO<sub>L<sub>i</sub></sub></i>	<i>MEMBER<sub>POL<sub>i</sub></sub></i>
<b><i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i><sup>(1)</sup></b>	0.071 (0.73)	-0.119 (-1.50)	-0.250 (-2.30)**	-0.223 (-2.55)**	-0.251 (-2.50)**	-0.256 (-2.42)**	-0.479 (-4.13)***	0.095 (0.86)	0.054 (0.53)	-0.117 (-1.03)	-0.185 (-1.71)*
<b>Male</b>	-0.024 (-0.75)	-0.003 (-0.11)	0.067 (1.88)*	0.013 (0.46)	-0.002 (-0.05)	0.027 (0.78)	0.056 (1.43)	0.096 (2.53)**	0.019 (0.56)	0.058 (1.49)	0.052 (1.42)
<b>Belongs to family of...</b>											
<b>Village headman</b>	-0.011 (-0.30)	0.009 (0.30)	0.055 (1.37)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.035 (-0.92)	-0.050 (-1.25)	0.026 (0.59)	0.069 (1.64)	-0.019 (-0.50)	0.027 (0.63)	0.052 (1.27)
<b>Land leader</b>	-0.085 (-1.96)**	-0.023 (-0.64)	-0.056 (-1.16)	-0.032 (-0.81)	-0.050 (-1.10)	-0.012 (-0.25)	0.019 (0.36)	-0.020 (-0.40)	0.082 (1.77)*	0.085 (1.62)	-0.073 (-1.48)
<b>Religious leader</b>	0.072 (1.64)	0.056 (1.57)	0.177 (3.66)***	0.027 (0.68)	0.117 (2.58)***	0.184 (3.84)***	0.058 (1.11)	0.017 (0.34)	-0.017 (-0.37)	-0.008 (-0.16)	-0.023 (-0.46)
<b>Marabout</b>	0.047 (0.98)	-0.011 (-0.28)	0.033 (0.62)	-0.009 (-0.21)	-0.002 (-0.04)	-0.015 (-0.28)	0.014 (0.24)	0.120 (2.14)**	0.025 (0.50)	-0.008 (-0.14)	0.055 (1.01)
<b>Ethnicity (Mother's tongue) [ref. is other]</b>											
<b>Bambara</b>	0.013 (0.22)	0.046 (0.96)	0.102 (1.59)	0.048 (0.91)	0.138 (2.28)**	0.074 (1.15)	0.099 (1.41)	-0.007 (-0.11)	0.021 (0.35)	-0.011 (-0.16)	0.056 (0.85)
<b>Malinke</b>	0.076 (1.11)	0.012 (0.22)	0.136 (1.80)*	0.054 (0.87)	0.112 (1.58)	0.102 (1.37)	0.136 (1.66)*	0.047 (0.59)	0.049 (0.68)	0.043 (0.52)	0.075 (0.97)
<b>Peul</b>	0.034 (0.43)	-0.000 (-0.00)	0.011 (0.13)	0.129 (1.80)*	0.056 (0.68)	0.070 (0.80)	0.107 (1.13)	-0.122 (-1.31)	0.063 (0.74)	-0.004 (-0.04)	0.020 (0.22)
<b>Sonraï/Djerma</b>	0.092 (0.93)	-0.053 (-0.65)	-0.024 (-0.22)	0.060 (0.68)	0.155 (1.52)	0.048 (0.45)	0.042 (0.36)	-0.052 (-0.45)	0.115 (1.10)	0.020 (0.17)	0.064 (0.57)
<b>Dogon</b>	0.000 (0.00)	0.009 (0.09)	0.055 (0.45)	0.027 (0.27)	-0.100 (-0.86)	-0.046 (-0.38)	0.088 (0.66)	-0.048 (-0.37)	-0.016 (-0.14)	0.099 (0.74)	0.052 (0.41)
<b>Soninke</b>	-0.016 (-0.22)	0.089 (1.49)	0.008 (0.10)	0.116 (1.78)*	0.120 (1.60)	0.168 (2.12)**	0.171 (1.97)**	-0.066 (-0.79)	-0.034 (-0.45)	0.035 (0.41)	0.127 (1.56)
<b>Khassonke</b>	-0.055 (-0.45)	-0.007 (-0.07)	-0.041 (-0.30)	0.013 (0.11)	0.047 (0.37)	0.086 (0.64)	0.146 (0.99)	-0.116 (-0.80)	-0.213 (-1.62)	-0.026 (-0.17)	0.115 (0.83)
<b>Age category [ref. is 18-25]</b>											
<b>[25 - 35 [</b>	-0.042 (-1.03)	0.033 (1.00)	0.007 (0.15)	-0.030 (-0.83)	-0.061 (-1.45)	-0.027 (-0.61)	-0.011 (-0.23)	-0.016 (-0.33)	-0.005 (-0.12)	-0.067 (-1.38)	0.015 (0.32)
<b>[35 - 45 [</b>	-0.067 (-1.31)	0.056 (1.34)	0.085 (1.50)	0.025 (0.54)	-0.024 (-0.44)	0.038 (0.67)	-0.018 (-0.29)	0.109 (1.83)*	-0.032 (-0.59)	-0.053 (-0.88)	0.074 (1.29)
<b>[45-60 [</b>	0.051 (0.90)	0.063 (1.36)	0.002 (0.04)	-0.040 (-0.79)	-0.032 (-0.55)	-0.030 (-0.48)	-0.049 (-0.72)	0.104 (1.57)	0.005 (0.08)	-0.002 (-0.02)	0.058 (0.90)
<b>[60 - 75 [</b>	-0.004 (-0.05)	0.052 (0.89)	-0.013 (-0.17)	-0.081 (-1.28)	-0.061 (-0.83)	0.060 (0.77)	-0.026 (-0.30)	-0.001 (-0.01)	-0.129 (-1.72)*	-0.224 (-2.65)***	-0.018 (-0.23)
<b>75 and more</b>	0.041 (0.46)	0.005 (0.07)	0.077 (0.78)	-0.098 (-1.21)	-0.045 (-0.48)	0.127 (1.28)	-0.230 (-2.13)**	0.132 (1.25)	-0.010 (-0.10)	-0.085 (-0.79)	-0.007 (-0.07)

(continued)

**Table A2. (continued)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>2013i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEMBER<sub>i</sub></i>
<b>Level of education [ref. is No education]</b>											
<b>Primary</b>	0.061 (1.48)	0.005 (0.16)	-0.050 (-1.10)	0.051 (1.37)	-0.056 (-1.30)	0.016 (0.34)	-0.083 (-1.68)*	0.038 (0.79)	-0.029 (-0.67)	0.134 (2.73)***	0.097 (2.08)**
<b>Secondary</b>	0.036 (0.84)	-0.013 (-0.36)	-0.009 (-0.18)	-0.039 (-1.00)	-0.071 (-1.58)	-0.029 (-0.61)	-0.113 (-2.17)**	0.065 (1.28)	0.045 (0.97)	0.113 (2.18)**	0.173 (3.54)***
<b>Tertiary</b>	-0.010 (-0.22)	-0.022 (-0.58)	-0.063 (-1.24)	-0.023 (-0.55)	-0.060 (-1.26)	-0.081 (-1.62)	-0.138 (-2.51)**	0.134 (2.50)**	0.081 (1.65)*	0.108 (1.97)**	0.132 (2.55)**
<b>Constant</b>	0.197 (2.71)***	0.083 (1.39)	0.218 (2.72)***	0.156 (2.39)**	0.270 (3.58)***	0.249 (3.13)***	0.431 (4.96)***	0.216 (2.55)**	0.680 (8.80)***	0.497 (5.72)***	0.117 (1.42)
Centered R2	0.031	0.000	0.066	0.005	0.040	0.040	0.003	0.065	0.039	0.027	0.020
F statistic	1.16	0.53	2.33	1.28	1.97	1.96	2.31	2.10	1.26	1.51	1.19
Underident. test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Weak ident. test	58.390	58.825	57.317	58.130	58.568	58.568	58.551	60.360	59.810	60.127	59.683
5% threshold	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91
Sargan (p value)	0.882	0.605	0.469	0.352	0.014	0.015	0.201	0.661	0.044	0.926	0.957
Number of obs.	847	848	841	846	847	847	847	851	850	850	850

<sup>(1)</sup> The reference category is “*Being a non-migrant*”.

\* p<0.10. \*\* p<0.05. \*\*\* p<0.01

List of instruments includes Eldest son dummy and link with household head.

Student’s t in parentheses

**Table A3. Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire vs. Non-migrants. Two-stage least squares results.**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>2013i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE<sub>POL<sub>i</sub></sub></i>	<i>MEMBER<sub>POL<sub>i</sub></sub></i>
<i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> <sup>(1)</sup>	0.233 (2.63)***	0.065 (0.86)	-0.176 (-1.81)*	0.006 (0.07)	-0.048 (-0.49)	-0.150 (-1.55)	-0.434 (-4.13)***	-0.103 (-1.09)	-0.169 (-1.89)*	-0.070 (-0.73)	-0.105 (-1.17)
Male	-0.006 (-0.17)	0.011 (0.36)	0.079 (2.04)**	0.027 (0.81)	0.018 (0.49)	0.032 (0.86)	0.080 (1.95)*	0.121 (3.11)***	0.054 (1.47)	0.064 (1.64)	0.029 (0.80)
<b>Belongs to family of.... [ref. is village's founders]</b>											
Village headman	-0.022 (-0.60)	-0.036 (-1.18)	0.043 (1.09)	-0.043 (-1.28)	-0.055 (-1.43)	-0.096 (-2.47)**	-0.041 (-0.96)	0.043 (1.07)	-0.010 (-0.27)	-0.043 (-1.07)	0.005 (0.13)
Village founders	-0.225 (-0.52)	-0.170 (-0.46)	0.733 (1.53)	-0.190 (-0.47)	-0.237 (-0.52)	-0.116 (-0.25)	-0.235 (-0.47)	-0.253 (-0.52)	-0.357 (-0.78)	0.513 (1.05)	-0.102 (-0.23)
Land leader	-0.112 (-2.62)***	-0.043 (-1.17)	0.011 (0.23)	-0.012 (-0.29)	-0.008 (-0.18)	0.030 (0.64)	0.073 (1.46)	-0.000 (-0.00)	0.050 (1.13)	0.157 (3.31)***	-0.009 (-0.21)
Religious leader	0.032 (0.73)	0.026 (0.70)	0.135 (2.78)***	-0.029 (-0.71)	0.042 (0.89)	0.141 (3.00)***	-0.016 (-0.31)	-0.057 (-1.17)	-0.036 (-0.77)	-0.047 (-0.97)	-0.074 (-1.65)*
Marabout	0.074 (1.58)	0.004 (0.09)	0.043 (0.84)	0.007 (0.16)	0.048 (0.96)	-0.038 (-0.75)	0.049 (0.90)	0.144 (2.80)***	0.068 (1.39)	0.017 (0.33)	0.074 (1.54)
<b>Ethnicity (Mother's tongue) [ref. is other]</b>											
Bambara	0.079 (1.38)	0.064 (1.32)	0.034 (0.53)	0.062 (1.16)	0.122 (1.99)**	0.069 (1.12)	0.076 (1.14)	0.012 (0.19)	0.043 (0.71)	-0.006 (-0.09)	0.041 (0.70)
Malinke	0.136 (2.11)**	0.068 (1.25)	0.069 (0.96)	0.058 (0.96)	0.095 (1.39)	0.081 (1.17)	0.137 (1.82)*	0.029 (0.40)	0.062 (0.91)	0.075 (1.04)	0.065 (0.98)
Peul	0.106 (1.40)	0.027 (0.42)	-0.055 (-0.66)	0.149 (2.10)**	0.050 (0.62)	0.117 (1.45)	0.144 (1.63)	-0.101 (-1.22)	0.026 (0.33)	0.048 (0.57)	0.031 (0.40)
Sonraï/Djerma	0.182 (1.86)*	-0.010 (-0.12)	-0.095 (-0.87)	0.081 (0.89)	0.175 (1.68)*	0.087 (0.83)	0.046 (0.40)	0.021 (0.19)	0.136 (1.31)	0.035 (0.32)	0.033 (0.33)
Dogon	0.152 (1.93)*	0.098 (1.46)	0.093 (1.07)	0.104 (1.40)	0.068 (0.80)	0.079 (0.94)	0.197 (2.14)**	0.097 (1.13)	0.065 (0.80)	0.047 (0.54)	0.051 (0.63)
Soninke	0.050 (0.70)	0.067 (1.11)	-0.025 (-0.32)	0.048 (0.73)	0.062 (0.82)	0.063 (0.82)	0.038 (0.46)	-0.061 (-0.79)	-0.149 (-2.03)**	-0.038 (-0.49)	0.047 (0.65)
Khassonke	0.147 (1.13)	0.112 (1.01)	-0.088 (-0.60)	0.082 (0.68)	0.173 (1.24)	0.284 (2.04)**	0.043 (0.29)	-0.168 (-1.15)	-0.215 (-1.55)	-0.063 (-0.43)	-0.052 (-0.38)
<b>Age category [ref. is 18-25]</b>											
[25 - 35 [	-0.008 (-0.21)	0.023 (0.69)	0.039 (0.89)	-0.025 (-0.68)	-0.030 (-0.72)	-0.016 (-0.38)	-0.002 (-0.04)	-0.038 (-0.87)	-0.033 (-0.79)	-0.096 (-2.15)**	0.009 (0.23)
[35 - 45 [	-0.016 (-0.36)	0.080 (2.04)**	0.086 (1.70)*	0.004 (0.10)	-0.038 (-0.77)	0.056 (1.14)	-0.044 (-0.82)	0.071 (1.40)	-0.030 (-0.63)	-0.119 (-2.32)**	0.035 (0.75)
[45-60 [	0.052 (1.00)	0.033 (0.75)	0.020 (0.35)	-0.069 (-1.43)	-0.038 (-0.68)	0.011 (0.20)	-0.104 (-1.73)*	0.091 (1.59)	-0.029 (-0.54)	0.007 (0.13)	0.094 (1.76)*

(continued)

**Table A3. (continued)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	<i>DEMOC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLITIC2<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>JUSTICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>POLICE<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>MEDIA<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>ARMY<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>i</sub></i>	<i>INTEREST<sub>2013i</sub></i>	<i>CLOSE<sub>POL<sub>i</sub></sub></i>	<i>MEMBER<sub>POL<sub>i</sub></sub></i>
<b>[60 - 75 [</b>	0.050 (0.71)	0.024 (0.40)	0.052 (0.67)	-0.086 (-1.30)	-0.092 (-1.20)	0.032 (0.41)	-0.120 (-1.45)	-0.018 (-0.23)	-0.093 (-1.25)	-0.192 (-2.49)**	0.014 (0.19)
<b>75 and more</b>	0.034 (0.37)	-0.009 (-0.11)	0.022 (0.22)	-0.116 (-1.36)	-0.068 (-0.70)	0.114 (1.18)	-0.254 (-2.40)**	0.097 (0.98)	-0.034 (-0.36)	-0.085 (-0.85)	0.030 (0.32)
<b>Level of education [ref. is No education]</b>											
<b>Primary</b>	0.084 (1.99)**	-0.000 (-0.01)	-0.073 (-1.55)	0.005 (0.13)	-0.090 (-1.97)**	0.007 (0.15)	-0.114 (-2.31)**	-0.033 (-0.70)	0.028 (0.62)	0.127 (2.66)***	0.141 (3.19)***
<b>Secondary</b>	0.035 (0.69)	-0.035 (-0.80)	-0.046 (-0.80)	-0.078 (-1.62)	-0.107 (-1.96)*	-0.022 (-0.40)	-0.179 (-2.98)***	-0.034 (-0.59)	0.081 (1.48)	0.103 (1.76)*	0.203 (3.76)***
<b>Tertiary</b>	0.028 (0.51)	-0.064 (-1.38)	-0.100 (-1.68)*	-0.082 (-1.60)	-0.118 (-2.02)**	-0.096 (-1.66)*	-0.261 (-4.11)***	0.057 (0.94)	0.128 (2.25)**	0.100 (1.65)*	0.138 (2.46)**
<b>Constant</b>	0.091 (1.18)	0.083 (1.28)	0.295 (3.46)***	0.189 (2.64)***	0.298 (3.64)***	0.253 (3.09)***	0.520 (5.80)***	0.292 (3.42)***	0.614 (7.59)***	0.512 (5.96)***	0.126 (1.59)
Centered R2	0.073	0.041	0.015	0.025	0.017	0.031	-0.010	0.034	0.082	0.052	0.052
F statistic	1.74	1.14	1.38	0.96	0.91	1.59	1.94	2.09	3.14	2.37	2.26
Underident. test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Weak ident. test	70.572	70.970	71.070	67.723	66.673	67.048	67.419	73.768	75.580	74.067	72.584
5% threshold	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91	13.91
Sargan (p value)	0.877	0.315	0.082	0.112	0.002	0.031	0.204	0.353	0.107	0.637	0.691
Number of obs.	894	893	907	885	883	884	888	923	914	922	918

<sup>(1)</sup> The reference category is “*Being a non-migrant*”.

\* p<0.10. \*\* p<0.05. \*\*\* p<0.01

List of instruments includes Eldest son dummy and link with household head. Student’s t in parentheses.

**Table A4. First stage regressions**

	(1) <i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> (vs. Non-migrants)	(2) <i>MIGIVOIRE<sub>i</sub></i> (vs. Non-migrants)	(3) <i>MIGFRANCE<sub>i</sub></i> (vs. Migrants in Côte d'Ivoire)
<b>Household head</b>	-0.341 (-12.62)***	-0.360 (-9.68)***	
<b>Spouse of the head</b>	-0.246 (-6.54)***	-0.337 (-8.56)***	
<b>Eldest among brothers</b>	0.143 (2.40)**	0.164 (2.76)***	
<b>Region of birth [ref. is Bamako]</b>			
<b>Kayes</b>			0.146 (2.50)**
<b>Koulikoro</b>			-0.414 (-6.17)***
<b>Sikasso</b>			-0.425 (5.62)***
<b>Ségou</b>			-0.323 (-4.23)***
<b>Mopti</b>			-0.410 (-4.48)***
<b>Gao/ Kidal</b>			-0.305 (-2.10)**
<b>Abroad</b>			-0.213 (-2.75)**
Observations	850	918	428
R-squared	0.4046	0.4376	0.5082

\* p<0.10. \*\* p<0.05. \*\*\* p<0.01

Student's t in parentheses

Control variables included for specifications (1), (2) and (3) are: gender, age, ethnicity, level of education and dummy variables indicating if the migrant belongs to a specific family in his village of origin (village headman, land leader, religious leader, marabout).